Developing a complex new product requires the rm both to deconstruct that product into subsystems and to create an organizational structure aligned with the product architecture. However, empirical evidence indicates that misalignments do occur and are usually one of two general forms: a hidden dependency, which is a missing link between teams responsible for two interacting subsystems; or spurious communications between two teams that interact even though their respective subsystems are not linked. We model the product development process as a search on a rugged landscape and study how misalignments aect the performance of the process in both design quality and convergence time. We nd that the eects are mediated by the organizational decision-making structure, and also by the interaction pattern among product subsystems. For instance, with a modular design, a project with hidden dependencies yields higher quality design solutions than a project with spurious communications or an aligned project. However, hidden dependencies cause a longer convergence time. Further, in modular designs spurious communications do not impact quality or convergence time when compared with aligned projects. The eect in non-modular product designs depends on the organizational decision-making structure and managerial capability. When decisions are made in a centralized organization that employs a capable manager, spurious communications improve the design quality and could delay the convergence time. We trace the cause of these eects to`type-II' errors committed by teams in the search process. Such errors make the search process more exploratory and covering a wider area of the search landscape.
Introduction
The Airbus A380, heralded as the world's largest passenger jetliner, nally began making commercial ights in 2007. However, the delays in its development had required Airbus to reschedule orders, pay out penalties to customers, and lay o part of its workforce. Wiring of the plane was the source of most of the problems. About 500 kilometers of wiring is needed for the A380. The wiring task was 1 Empirical studies generally nd product and organizational architectures misaligned. Misalignments occur when two subsystems interact while their corresponding teams do not (an unmatched interface or a hidden dependency) and when two teams interact while the subsystems they are developing do not (an unmatched interaction or spurious communication) (see Sosa et al. 2004 , Gokpinar et al. 2010 . We study the consequences of such misalignments on the performance of PD teams in a model of product development as a search process by a number of teams on rugged interdependent landscapes. Misalignments may deteriorate or improve the quality of the nal design and the time it takes for teams to converge to this design. Understanding these potential consequences helps managers to allocate limited resources eectively to manage misalignments and improve the performance of the design process.
We conceptualize a PD project as a search process on a landscape to nd the best possible design. We simulate the search process by an NK tness landscape model. In this model, there are S subsystems each with u elements that form a system with N = S × u elements. Each element of a subsystem has an average of K h interactions with other elements of that same subsystem. The parameter K b represents the average number of interactions between the interface elements of one subsystem with those of other subsystems; thus changing the status of one interface element in the design of one subsystem aects K b other interface elements in the design of other subsystems.
Furthermore, the system adapts by making either incremental or long-jump searches to nd a (possibly local) optimal point (Kauman 1993) . Because complex PD systems are often nearly decomposable (Simon 1962) , we choose the parameters K h and K b to reect such systems in our study.
We assume that misalignments occur across the boundaries of teams and subsystems rather than within them (Sosa et al. 2004) . Misalignments may be due to unknown interactions between subsystems or to lack of appropriate coordination mechanisms between teams (Srikanth and Puranam 2011) . In each stage of the search, if a hidden dependency occurs then we assume that an interface decision between two subsystems is overlooked. This means that an interface may be known
to teams yet those teams may fail to update themselves on the current status or may ignore the interdependency owing to overcondence or workload. Spurious communication between teams with independent subsystems anchors the teams on other teams' design ideas which may cause information overload and hurt a team's performance or provide new design alternatives and improve its performance. We model spurious communication in a similar approach to hidden dependencies.
Our goal is to study the performance implications of misalignments in complex PD projects.
Performance in our study is dened as the nal design's quality and also the time it takes for teams to converge to this design. These two dimensions of performance capture the key factors in evaluating a PD project especially in competitive markets. The design quality is the average of nal design qualities of all teams. Convergence is dened to occur whenever no team can increase its tness value by further local search; that is a local optimum design or a sticking point has been reached (Mihm et al. 2003, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2002) .
In this setup, we seek to address our main research question: Do misalignments degrade PD project performance?and, if so, which type of misalignment generates a larger eect and why? Spurious communications may facilitate coordination among homogeneous teams and increase performance (O'Reilly et al. 1989, Zenger and Lawrence 1989) . They may also have the opposite eect to the extent that teams' limited attention is consumed by unnecessary communication and information (Bantel and Jackson 1989, Ancona and Caldwell 1992) . Our results show that the answer to this question is conditional on two factors. The rst is the organizational structure of the PD project, i.e., how decisions are made in the design process. We consider two decision-making structures: centralized and decentralized. In a centralized structure, the project manager considers only those alternatives by a team that improve the tness value of all design teams (or leave them unchanged).
That is, if an alternative reduces the tness value of any team, it is eliminated from the consideration set. In a decentralized structure, however, all design proposals by teams are taken into account and go through further development. A decentralized organization then has an inherent tendency to explore.
The second is the interaction pattern among product subsystems. We study three empiricallyobserved interaction patterns: dependent, hierarchical, and modular (Ulrich 1995, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2007) . The rst two patterns represent PD systems in which subsystems exert asymmetric inuence on each other (Strogatz 2001, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2007) . In other words, some subsystems aect the performance of many others or are aected by many. The third pattern, enforces a symmetrical structure where . . . parameters and tasks are interdependent within units (modules) and independent across them (Baldwin and Clark 2000) .
Our simulation results show that a PD project with hidden dependencies outperforms both aligned projects and those with spurious communications when the product design is modular. However, a project with hidden dependencies needs more time to converge. These observations hold in both centralized and decentralized decision-making structures and for projects in which subsystems' interactions follow a hierarchical or dependent pattern (provided that the subsystem interaction intensity exceeds a threshold).
The decision-making organization becomes more critical when we compare aligned projects to those with spurious communications. These projects do not dier in performance (i.e., quality and convergence time) when the product design is modular. However, when subsystems interact in a hierarchical or dependent pattern, and decisions are made in a centralized organization that employs a manager, spurious communications improve the design quality and could delay the convergence time. In our simulation model, we measure managerial capability as the number of design alternatives a manager can evaluate in each simulation time.
We trace the cause of these eects to the errors committed by search teams in the search process.
There are two types of errors: a type-I error occurs when a team rejects a superior design while a type-II error occurs when a team accepts an inferior design. We nd that type-II errors are the root cause for the eects we observe in our experiments. This is because accepting inferior designs directly aects the search paths of design teams and makes the search process more exploratory.
Exploration in turn results in better designs while often lengthening the convergence time.
These results shed light on the Airbus A380 design issues. The design and development of different subsystems of A380 was distributed among more than 200 rst-tier suppliers across multiple countries. Such large-scale projects are generally organized in a decentralized organization in which, as we nd, hidden dependencies delay the convergence time. This insight is in line with the empirical nding by Gokpinar et al. (2013) that geographically-distributed vehicle development projects are often delayed.
Our study is exploratory in nature and provides a rich set of hypotheses for future empirical studies that rely on real rather than simulated data. These studies could have profound implications for PD project management. For instance, when a rm competes on development time (i.e., to introduce new products in a short time), teams' communications should be managed depending on the decision making organization and subsystem interaction pattern. A modular product design curbs the eect of spurious communications on convergence time, so resources should be allocated to identifying and managing hidden dependencies. In a hierarchical or dependent design that is managed under a decentralized or a centralized organization with a capable manager, both of misalignment types delay the convergence time and resources should be allocated to identifying and managing both types.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant work. Section 3 describes the mathematical model as well as conceptualization of the search process and of the two types of misalignment. In that section we also dene the errors and the convergence characteristics that we investigate. In Section 4 we detail the experiments and report the results. Section 5 discusses the limitations of this research and concludes the paper. In this section, we also specify empirical hypotheses based on our simulations that future research could explore empirically.
2.
Literature Review
Complex systems are made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way (Simon 1962) . In order to manage these systems, organizations divide them into a number of subsystems that are handled by individuals or teams. Yet boundedly rational decision makers inevitably overlook some relevant variables and their interactions (Schrader et al. 1993, Sommer and Loch 2004) . Furthermore, individuals and teams may lack full coordination and may also use obsolete information about other subsystems when solving their own problems (Mihm et al. 2003 (Mihm et al. , 2010 .
To achieve coordination, it is natural to expect that organizational communications should occur whenever there is a technical interaction (Le and Panchal 2012) . This approach looks at what is known as socio-technical coordination and measures the alignment between organizational and product architectures by socio-technical congruence. Kwan et al. (2011) nd that high socio-technical congruence leads to a higher successful build rate for collocated teams but not for distributed teams. Cataldo and Herbsleb (2013) investigate two large-scale software development projects and nd that low congruence increases software failures. They also report an association between high congruence and improved development productivity.
Other studies investigate the mirroring hypothesis according to which there is a match between the two architectures (Colfer and Baldwin 2016, MacCormack et al. 2012) . The empirical ndings are mixed for this hypothesis. Colfer and Baldwin review 142 empirical studies and nd that about two thirds of this sample support the mirroring hypothesis; however it is rejected in other cases where, for instance collocated, highly interactive teams within a single rm designed a modular system made up of independent components or in some cases, tight-knit teams can`break the mirror' and create modular technical architectures that do not reect their own communication patterns. As one might expect, the hypothesis nds support mainly in projects run within a rm or across a few rms but typically fails in open, collaborative projects.
Empirical studies on complex product development projects also report misaligned product and organizational architectures. Sosa et al. (2004) investigate product and organizational architectures of a large commercial aircraft engine development and nd that both critical and noncritical interactions may be unknown to PD teams. They argue that, although the performance implications of such unknown interactions may be low, they can result in considerable extra expenditure during each airplane's lifespan. Gokpinar et al. (2010) quantify the mismatches between product and organizational architectures in an auto manufacturer by using a coordination decit metric. They nd an inverse-U relationship between product quality (as measured by the number of warranty claims) and a subsystem's centrality in the product architecture. That is, subsystems of intermediate complexity cause more quality problems. In a subsequent study, Gokpinar et al. (2013) nd that geographically-distributed vehicle development projects yield lower quality designs and are often delayed.
These observations are partly consistent with our ndings if one can argue that globallydistributed development teams are more likely to be organized in decentralized decision-making structures. Our results show that in a decentralized organization, misalignments cause more performance loss and benets. While they improve the nal quality, but they also make the convergence or development time longer. Sosa et al. (2007) propose two dierent types of misalignments in the design and development of complex products. On the one hand, unmatched interfaces occur when the designers of two subsystems do not have organizational ties (i.e., do not communicate even though the two subsystems are functionally interactive). On the other hand, unmatched interactions occur when PD teams of two unrelated subsystems nonetheless interact. We refer to unmatched interfaces as hidden dependencies and to unmatched interactions as spurious communications.
With hidden dependencies, the lack of communication between teams on these dependencies can cause two problems. First, because of interdependencies among subsystems, the overall performance depends on how well the teams can assess the consequences of their decisions on other teams'
decisions. This dynamic is reected in the notion of teams' payo functions being dependent on the trans-specialty understanding (Postrel 2002) . Such understanding helps members of one specialty assess the role played by other specialties in solving a problem, which increases the odds that a team's decisions will be aligned with those of other teams for the benet of the overall project.
Second, glitches occur often in product development projects (Hoopes and Postrel 1999, Hoopes 2001) . A glitch is a costly mistake that may occur in a multi-agent project owing to lack of shared knowledge about problem constraints. Glitches are not limited to highly complex projects. Hoopes and Postrel provide an example of a new executive information software which took the designers months to create with the capability to generate reports for dierent categories of customers, products, and years. When the design was being coded by programmers however, they realized that the relevant databases could not be searched for products. The time spent by designers and programmers to solve that problem makes this mistake a costly glitch. In short, hidden dependencies are likely to degrade the performance of PD teams through either the reduction of trans-specialty understanding or by causing glitches.
Spurious communication among PD teams exposes them to new ideas and may establish informal communication channels that managers and designers in charge of developing subsystems nd useful in the PD process. It however increases the teams' workload, which in turn may increase the error rate and create unexpected problems (Rahmandad and Repenning 2008) . The extra workload alters the dynamics and expected performance of PD projects through reghting: the allocation of scarce resources to unexpected problems , Repenning 2001 . Operating in a reghting mode causes rework that leads to budget and cost overruns. Spurious communication increases the PD teams' workload; hence it is likely to generate more res or unexpected problems, which has a negative eect on the performance of product development projects.
Although one may expect misalignments in product and organizational architectures to degrade complex PD performance, the literature is unclear on extent of this eect. Much research on distributed design (Mihm et al. 2003 , Braha and Bar-Yam 2007 , Mihm et al. 2010 ) and on distributed search in complex systems (Lazer and Friedman 2007, Baumann 2015) implicitly assumes that product and organization architectures are aligned. Some authors do acknowledge the existence of misalignments and their negative consequences (e.g., Sosa et al. (2004 Sosa et al. ( , 2007 , Gokpinar et al. (2010) ). Yet our paper is the rst to model a PD project to explicitly study misalignments and their consequences as a function of organizational decision-making structure, interaction patterns among product subsystems, managerial decision making capabilities, and the number of teams involved in the development process. Our results show that misalignments are not always detrimental to the performance of PD projects.
We study two decision-making structures: centralized and decentralized. Centralized structures mainly shrink convergence time while decentralized structures typically result in higher quality designs (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003 , Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005 , Mihm et al. 2010 ). We also consider three subsystem interaction patterns: hierarchical, dependent and modular which have been empirically observed in PD projects (MacCormack et al. 2006, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2007) .
We model the product development process as search on a rugged landscape by teams that conduct local search until a local peak is obtained. An early paper using this approach in operations management was Mihm et al. (2003) in which the authors model a distributed design project with interdependent subsystems. Their results illustrate that nonlinearity and complexity are both increasing in the size of the system. Mihm et al. (2010) employ a similar model to investigate the eects of organizational hierarchy on solution quality, stability, and speed in distributed search projects. Baumann (2015) identies contingency factors that inuence the value of integration among decentralized searchers in a complex system. These studies, too, implicitly assume aligned product and organizational architectures.
Finally, the result of our simulated search process at any time is represented by a tness value. This concept was rst developed by Kauman (1993) in the biology literature, in which a tness landscape function is conceived for a set of complex interactive elements governed by a number of agents.
The idea was incorporated into the engineering design and management literature by Levinthal and Warglien (1999) , Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) , Rivkin (2000) , and Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) .
Model
In this section, we set up the mathematical model we use to simulate the search process. The model has four components: (i) characterization of the landscapes over which the teams search, (ii) the organizational structure within which the search teams and managers operate, (iii) a conceptualization of misalignment forms, and (iv) an operationalization of performance measures. We next discuss each component and characterize the search process.
The Landscape Model
We apply an NK landscape search model to simulate the product development process (Kauman 1993 
In equation 1, C(a s j |a) is the contribution of each design element a s j when the system design is a. The overall tness of the PD system for design alternative a is f (a):
In the NK landscape model, the contribution of each element depends on that element's state as well as the state of other elements interacting with it. In the classical NK landscape model, parameter K species the degree of interaction among elements: the contribution of one element C(a s j |a) depends on the state of K other randomly selected elements. In our simulation study, we slightly modify this approach to control the interdependencies within and between subsystems. In particular, we specify interactions by using two parameters instead of one as we discuss next.
In our model, we rst determine subsystem-level interactions, i.e., which subsystems interact.
Subsystems in a PD project may relate to each other in dierent architectures (or patterns). Figures   1 and 2 show three such patterns: dependent, hierarchical, and modular. Figure 1 depicts these patterns for 4 teams and Figure 2 for 6 teams. These interaction patterns have been studied in the NK and new product development literature (Ulrich 1995, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2007) . In Section 4.2, we also study variants of the dependent and hierarchical patterns. Assume each element of subsystem s interacts with K h other elements of the same subsystem.
These are within-subsystem interactions. Assume also that x elements of subsystem s have K b
interactions with x elements of subsystem s . These design decisions which interact with decisions of other subsystems are called interface decisions.
Within-and between-subsystem interactions are element-level interactions and randomly determined. Moreover, it is natural to expect subsystems to have more intense within-rather than
As an example, consider the dependent pattern in Figure 
Once the set of design elements that interact with an element of each subsystem is specied and the possible contribution values are generated, we can proceed to create the landscape function.
The contribution values are drawn from a uniform [0, 1] distribution but the properties of the tness landscape are not sensitive to the distribution applied to generate the landscape (Weinberger 1991) .
The next stage in the NK model is characterization of the search process on the landscape which depends on the organizational structure and the teams' search behavior. We describe these in detail in the next two sections.
Organizational Structure in the NK Search Model
Firms dier in their organizational structure: [t]he structure of an organization can be dened simply as the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them (Mintzberg 1979) . Therefore, dierent organizational designs and structures exist which aect the rms' approach to product development.
We consider two variations on how the decisions are made in an organization: centralized and decentralized. Generally, centralization points to the locus of authority to make decisions (Pugh et al. (1968) , p. 76), and it occurs when decision-making power resides in the hands of a selected few at the upper levels of an organization, whereas decentralization occurs when decision-making power involves individuals at various organizational levels (Wong et al. (2011 (Wong et al. ( ), p. 1210 .
A centralized decision-making process may have both positive and negative consequences for a rm. Centralization bestows the decision-making power to high-level managers and so facilitates trade-o decisions such as conict resolution (Sheremata 2000) . On the other hand, centralization may dilute employees' sense of ownershipwho are specialists and engaged with the PD process directly. Moreover, in a centralized organization, the information may get distorted as it moves up the organization depending on the peculiar incentives along the hierarchy (Wong et al. 2011 ).
In a decentralized structure, several independent decision makers can accept or reject projects or ideas. In other words, if one of the managers in a decentralized organization accepts an idea, that idea goes through further development, while in a centralized organization, only one top manager decides to accept/reject the ideas (Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005) . The distinction between these two decision making structures helps us to test for any association between the misalignments and the decision-making structure. We next describe how we operationalize this distinction.
We model the PD organization as a collection of teams. The teams' authority and control over decisions depend on the decision making structure which is either centralized or decentralized. In both structures, the teams conduct subsystem-level search. That subsystem search process is a design generation and selection process (Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005) . At time t = 0, each team is randomly assigned a state and the team's tness value is calculated. At each subsequent time t, the teams perform local search by changing one (or more) of their subsystem elements' states from 0 to 1 or vice versa. This local search results in more than one design alternative. The status quo is also one of the alternatives. These alternatives do not necessarily improve the tness value of the team because they are generated given the status quo of other teams. However, the alternative may prove valuable once other teams change their status. This procedure introduces an exploration aspect to teams' search whereby they take some risk in experimentation which may help them escape local optima and nd better peaks in their search landscapes.
Once all teams have completed their search process and have selected their preferred solutions, the product-level search process is initiated. This search process depends on the decision-making arrangement. In a decentralized organization, each team manager has full authority to make decisions in her subsystem, without being required to coordinate or seek approval from other team mangers. Therefore, after evaluating its new alternative solution and the status quo, each PD team selects (and implements) the one that improves her performance function the most.
In the centralized arrangement, each team manager evaluates the solutions (one of which is the status quo) and selects the one that improves the team's performance function the most. Then, the selected solution is submitted to a top PD manager. This manager creates Q (the higher the parameter Q, the more capable the manager) composite alternatives and evaluates them. These composites consider all the alternatives proposed by teams. For example, if there are four teams and each one proposes three alternatives, the manager has 3 4 = 81 composite alternatives. All these alternatives are eligible design proposals among which the manager randomly chooses and evaluates Q. This evaluation takes into account the performance of all teams. She selects the one composite alternative that improves the overall tness value the most. If none of the composite alternatives improves the overall tness value of the project, then all teams retain their status quo.
The details of subsystem-and product-level search algorithms are provided in Appendix.
Misalignment Forms in the NK Search Model
Resources (e.g., time, human expertise, and funds) available to teams to manage the interfaces of their subsystems are limited. One may expect that these resources are optimally allocated to the existing and well-understood interfaces. In a complex PD project however a team's performance and reward depend highly on other teams; an instance of what Puranam et al. (2012) call broad incentives which, they show, result in a link between two subsystems being neither necessary nor sucient for the teams in charge of them to interact or, even if they do, dedicate the optimal level of resources. Misalignments then happen when there is a missing link between teams in charge of interacting subsystems or when teams interact even though their respective subsystems are not linked.
In the absence of misalignments, a team knows the states of all the interdependent teams' elements and conducts an informed local search. A PD team in a project without misalignments has an appropriate and balanced allocation of resources to within-and between-subsystems' interactions.
However, no misalignments in a complex PD project represents an ideal scenario because it requires a substantial amount of resources, instantaneous information broadcast, and a rigorous control system (Mihm et al. 2003 , Gokpinar et al. 2010 . Misalignments distort the allocation of resources and, as a result, a team may be more focused on managing the interactions among its own elements or that among its elements and those of other teams. We next explain the dynamics of resource allocation and misalignment occurrence formally.
We conceptualize three dierent (mis)alignment scenarios: (i) in an aligned scenario, teams interact when their respective subsystems interact, (ii) in a misaligned scenario with a hidden dependency, teams fail to attend to the interface of their subsystems, and (iii) in a misaligned scenario with a spurious communication, two teams interact despite their subsystems being independent of each other.
There are many possibilities for teams' interaction arrangements each with dierent type and number of (mis)alignments. Figure 3 shows two possible arrangements with six teams. In the left panel, teams 1 and 2 are interacting while other teams are working on their own subsystems (i.e., on their non-interface decisions). In the right panel, teams 2 and 4 and teams 5 and 6 are interacting (i.e., working on their interface decisions) while teams 1 and 3 are working on their own subsystems.
Suppose the product architecture is modular as in Figure 2 . The team interaction arrangement in the left panel of Figure 3 then consists of an aligned interaction (teams 1 and 2) and two hidden dependencies (teams 3 and 4 and teams 5 and 6). Similarly, the right panel in Figure 3 consists of one aligned interaction (teams 5 and 6), two hidden dependencies and one spurious communication (teams 2 and 4). Figure 3 given the modular product design in Figure 2 .
With this machinery, we can now proceed to operationalize systems that are particularly prone to a certain type of misalignment and study their performance in comparison to other systems. As the PD process progresses, the team interaction arrangement (may) changes. That is, an interaction between two subsystems may be attended to in one time period (aligned) and overlooked in the other (hidden dependency). Similarly, two teams may interact despite their subsystems not interacting (a spurious communication) or interact with their subsystems interdependent (aligned). Therefore, to generate a PD system aected mainly by (say) hidden dependencies, at each time period, we give a higher probability of occurrence to those interaction arrangements dominated by hidden dependencies.
More specically, at each simulation time t, a team interaction instance v is selected with proba-
1 In other words, for PD systems prone to hidden dependencies, team interaction instances with higher number of hidden dependencies have signicantly higher chances to occur during the PD project. We apply a similar approach to generate the aligned PDs or those with spurious communications.
1 The parameter J ≥ 1 is a xed integer which we set experimentally to improve the odds of selecting instances with a certain type of misalignment.
Details of our algorithm to generate aligned or misaligned PDs are in Appendix. Nonetheless, we clarify one critical assumption here. When we select two teams to interact at time t, we assume only one team (randomly selected) involves in a subsystem-level search (on interface decisions) and the other team remains inactive in time period t. This makes a sharper contrast in the performance of the two teams when they interact compared with when they do not (where both teams conduct their subsystem-level search on non-interface decisions).
Product Development Performance
In this section, we introduce two performance measures to evaluate the PD process. The rst measure is the overall tness value (quality) of the nal design solution which we dened as f (a) in Section 3; see equation (2).
The second measure examines the eects of misalignments on the convergence of the search process. Convergence occurs whenever no team can increase its tness value by further local search that is, when a locally optimal design has been reached (Mihm et al. 2003) . To operationalize the convergence behavior in a PD project, we follow Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) and assume convergence occurs when we observe status stability for all teams for a certain amount of time (i.e., 2% or 4% of simulation time). That means, at each time t, we compare the status of all teams for the past 2% (or 4%) of simulation time and if we nd no change for any team, then we record t + 1 as the convergence time; otherwise we continue the search process. We choose this approach for two reasons: (i) it assures, given the status of other teams, every team has obtained a local optimum in its respective search landscape, (ii) in practice, time itself is a limited resource. If the design process does not converge in a reasonable amount of time, then project managers may remedy the situation by, for example, reverting to previous designs or freezing the design of some teams and letting others to continue the search until convergence (Mihm et al. 2003 ).
Once we have established how misalignments aect the nal design quality and the convergence time of the search process, we will investigate why these eects exist. To this end, we will evaluate the design errors whereby some superior (inferior) solutions are omitted (committed). This evaluation of errors provides an understanding of teams' performance in recognizing designs with higher tness values and not being trapped in those with lower tness values. We study two types of errors: (1) type-I error or the likelihood of rejecting superior designs, and (2) type-II error or the likelihood of accepting inferior designs.
To understand our measure of type-I and II errors, consider an example where a product with S = 4 subsystems and N = 20 design elements is being developed by four teams. Assume a decentralized PD organization, and that the product design vector (i.e., state) at time t is a = ∪ 
Experiments and Results
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and report the results. We rst detail the simulation procedure and its ingredients; then we discuss the results of two sets of experiments. The parameter N in the NK simulation model is the total number of elements in the landscape. In the literature on complex landscape simulations, this number varies between 6 and 12 (see e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003 , Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003 , Rivkin and Siggelkow 2007 , Baumann 2013 ).
In our experiments, we assume that the project organization consists of four teams and each team controls four elements and therefore N = 16. We also study a 6-team project organization with each team controlling three elements (so N = 18). The results in this section correspond to N = 16. 2
Many complex products are nearly-decomposable or modular: they are decomposed into subsystems with weak interactions (Simon 1962) . In other words, the subsystems are loosely coupled together. We focus on nearly-decomposable systems in our model and choose the parameters K h and K b to mirror these systems. In particular, modular products have a high level of interactions among the elements of subsystems (a relatively high K h value) while the elements of dierent subsystems have a low level of interactions (a relatively low K b value). In our experiments, to construct a nearly-decomposable product, we assume an element of a team has K h = 2 interactions with the other elements of the same team. Also, we let the parameter K b = 1 to capture the low number of interactions between an interface element of one team with that of another team.
2 The results for a 6-team project organization are available from authors upon request.
We assume the number of interface decisions is x = 1. We also use J = 5 to select teams' interaction arrangement at each time period; see Sections 3.1 and 3.3.
The values we choose for parameters K h and K b as well as the interaction patterns among the subsystems' elements represent plausible PD systems in the automotive, printing, semiconductor, and power plant industries; see Table 1 in Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) 
Experiment 1: PD Performance and Interaction Patterns
In the rst set of experiments, we focus on evaluating the performance of PD projects with the interaction patterns we dened in Section 3.1 (i.e., dependent, hierarchical, and modular). We investigate how the two misalignment types aect the tness value of the project (i.e., the project's overall quality) and whether (and under what conditions) misalignments may improve the project's performance in comparison with an aligned system? We also study the convergence time of the search process as a proxy for development time which is among the most important criteria to evaluate the performance of a PD project (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001) , and more so in competitive markets.
To clarify how misalignments aect the search process, we also examine teams' design errors. In particular, teams may reject superior designs (type-I error) or accept inferior designs (type-II error).
As the nal step in the rst set of experiments, we also examine whether there are any associations between these design errors and PD performance measures. The error analysis will help us provide a rationale for our simulation results.
4.1.1. Decentralized Organization and Product Development Performance. In this section, we consider projects with a decentralized decision-making organization and compare the performance of an aligned project with that of a project with either hidden dependencies or spurious communications. We simulate each scenario for a xed number of time periods and record the performance of all teams. Figure 4 shows the performance for each of the three teams' interaction patterns. Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4 show that with dependent and hierarchical interaction patterns, misaligned PD projects of either type (hidden dependencies or spurious communications) achieve a signicantly higher performance than an aligned project. Further, at the early stages of simulation, those projects with hidden dependencies outperform those with spurious communications but the two project types' performance gets closer over time.
With a modular design (panel c in Figure 4 ), projects with hidden dependencies achieve signicantly higher tness values than aligned projects or those with spurious communications. Spurious communications do not seem to aect the performance when compared with aligned projects.
Bottom panels in Figure 4 show the convergence time. We say the search has converged if for four simulation time periods, corresponding to 2% of the total simulation time, we observe status stability for all teams. Our results show a dierence in convergence time only in modular systems with hidden dependencies. Such systems take considerably longer time to converge to a nal solution.
This result is robust if we dene convergence as status stability in eight time periods (equivalent to 4% of the total simulation time).
4.1.2. Decentralized Organization and Search Performance. To understand the main drivers to our results, we examine the search process teams go through to obtain the nal solution.
In particular, we investigate the magnitude and the frequency of design errors; see Section 3.4. While the frequency captures how prone the teams are to commit errors under each type of misalignment, the magnitude captures the size of the error whenever one happens. In this paper, we report the results for the magnitude of design errors as they enable us to discuss the underlying mechanisms of a PD project's performance.
3 Figure 5 shows the largest magnitude of type-I and type-II errors when decisions are made in a decentralized organization. At each simulation time, we record the largest design error among all teams. This amounts to 150 observations for that particular time as we have 50 × 3 = 150
(landscape,starting point)' combinations. The average value of these 150 observations is what we report for that simulation time in Figure 5 . The top panels in Figure 5 show that the magnitude of type-I errors is not signicantly dierent across misaligned and aligned projects. In other words, misalignments have no notable consequences on the superior design solutions that get rejected by PD teams.
3 The results on the frequency of design errors are available from the authors. Type-II errors show a dierent pattern in our experiments depending on the misalignment types.
Hidden dependencies result in signicantly larger type-II design errors than spurious communications. The same holds when we compare projects with hidden dependencies with aligned projects.
Further, the type-II errors are more serious (are of larger magnitude) in modular products. This can be attributed to the height and dispersion of local optima over the landscape. In particular, on a landscape with relatively low complexity level, the height and dispersion signicantly of local optimal change when the interaction pattern changes from a modular to either a dependent or a hierarchical pattern (see panels 3 and 5 of Table 3 , p. 1076 in Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) ). In sum, teams in projects with hidden dependencies appear to accept more inferior design solutions and more so in PDs with modular designs.
It is plausible to argue that accepting inferior designs (type-II errors) directly changes the teams' search path while rejecting superior designs (type-I errors) does not. That is, by committing type-I errors teams forgo the paths they could have explored whereas type-II errors determine which search paths they actually take.
The eects of type-I and -II errors can also be seen from an exploration vs. exploitation perspective. Type-II errors make a search process more exploratory by which a wider scope of the design landscape is likely to be examined. Therefore, larger type-II errors add to the exploratory nature of the search and result in higher performance. Projects with hidden dependencies are prone to more exploration (a similar eect as coordination neglect in a distributed problem-solving systems (Baumann 2015)) and obtain higher performance levels when design landscape has a modular interaction pattern.
Our results show that teams with hidden-dependencies commit larger type-II errors and type-II errors (due to their exploration-inducing nature) lead to higher performance. However, exploration causes a longer convergence time.
4.1.3. Centralized Organization and Product Development Performance. In this section, we consider projects with centralized decision-making organization and compare the performance of aligned and misaligned PD projects. The top manager choosing among the alternatives may be of limited managerial capability.
4 A manager with limited capability in our model creates Q = 2 composite alternatives and evaluates them at each simulation time. In contrast, a capable manager creates and evaluates Q = 8 composite alternatives. Our results with a capable manager in charge of making the key decisions is similar to those under decentralized organizations. This is not surprising as the higher the number of alternatives the manager can process, the closer the setting becomes in performance to a decentralized organization in which all the alternatives are evaluated by teams. We relegate these results to Appendix and focus, in this section, on projects with an inexperienced (i.e., limited capability) top manager.
The upper panels in Figure 6 show the performance of organizations with inexperienced managers. With a dependent interaction pattern, aligned and misaligned PD projects achieve a similar tness performance level once convergence has occurred. However, with hierarchical and modular patterns (panels b and c), spurious communications adversely aect the performance of the project in comparison to aligned projects or those with hidden dependencies. A modular design however benets from hidden dependencies and achieves a signicantly better performance.
The lower panels in Figure 6 illustrate the convergence time. For a product with hierarchical or dependent interaction patterns, convergence time of the misaligned and aligned projects do not dier. However, with a modular product design, hidden dependencies cause longer convergence times than spurious communications. Projects with spurious communications have similar convergence behavior to that of aligned systems.
Similar to Section 4.1.2, we examined the magnitude of type-I and II design errors. The results are in Appendix. We observe that in modular PD systems, larger type-II errors are associated with superior performance.
4 Managerial capability is not a key consideration in decentralized decision-making organizations. In a second set of experiments, we run simulations with variants of the dependent and hierarchical patterns (see Section 3.1). These experiments enable us to investigate the robustness of our results in Experiment 1 (Section 4.1) to changes in the interaction pattern among subsystems. In particular, this analysis in helpful to distinguish the eect of spurious communications on the performance of PD projects when compared with aligned projects. As we will see this comparison is mediated by the complexity level (i.e., the interaction intensity among subsystems) in the PD project.
In this section, we consider PD projects with four subsystems and six variants of the hierarchical interaction pattern. We relegate those with dependent interaction pattern to the Appendix. We note that the overall ndings for the hierarchical patterns hold for those with dependent interaction patterns as well. Figure 7 shows the interaction patterns we study in this section. 4.2.1. Decentralized Decision-Making Organization. Tables 1 and 2 report the comparison results for the quality (tness value) of the nal design and convergence time.
6 We observe that as the landscape complexity increases (i.e., intensity of subsystems' interactions increases from pattern I to pattern VI), PD projects with hidden dependencies tend to exhibit the following characteristics: (i) they attain higher tness values than both aligned projects and those with spurious communications and (ii) they need longer time to converge. Tables 1 and 2 also show a signicant dierence between systems with spurious communications and aligned projects. As the landscape complexity (that is the interaction intensity among subsystems) increases and in comparison with aligned projects, PD systems with spurious communications attain higher tness values and require a longer time to converge. 6 We use an asterisk to indicate a 1% signicance level in all tables throughout the paper. explore a wider scope of the design landscape. This exploration through accepting inferior designs explicitly impacts the search trajectory of PD projects. As one might expect, this exploration comes at a cost as teams take a longer time to converge to a nal design (see Tables 1 and 2 ). The magnitude of type-I errors which are reported in Appendix do not reveal any particular pattern.
Type-I errors are largely inconsequential in the nal quality and convergence time of PD projects. Tables 6-9 in Appendix show that our results on the eect of hidden dependencies in PD performance in decentralized decision-making organizations (Section 4.2.1) extend to centralized organizations. This holds regardless of the PD manager's (i.e., Q = 2, 8).
Managerial capability has important consequences when comparing PD projects with spurious communications and aligned projects. With Q = 8, we nd that spurious communications lead to better nal design quality and longer convergence time. When Q = 2, however, our results do not provide a conclusive comparison between the two project types. Depending on the interaction pattern, one type may achieve a higher tness value (and longer convergence time).
Tables 4-5 compare the largest magnitude of type-II design errors.
7 We observe that as the complexity of the system increases, PD systems with hidden dependencies make considerably larger type-II errors than the aligned projects and the ones with spurious communications. In addition, when managerial processing power is high (Q = 8), teams with spurious communications make larger type-II errors than teams in aligned projects. However, when the PD manager processing power is low (Q = 2), depending on the interaction pattern among PD subsystems, one of the two projects types (i.e., aligned and those with spurious communications) makes larger type-II errors.
We note that when the PD manager's processing power is low, the chances of an inferior design solution proposed by a team (a type-II error) to be evaluated and adopted by the PD manager is small ( 2
That is, the PD manager's low capability damps the exploration in the search. This manifests itself when we compare the search behavior of PD projects with spurious communications with that of aligned projects. In contrast, when Q = 8, the chances of an inferior design solution to be evaluated and adopted by the PD manager is higher ( Q=8 still maintains a degree of exploration. This is why the performance of such centralized systems is closer to decentralized systems (compare Tables 1-2 with Tables 8-9 ).
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper proposes a model for studying how misalignments between product and organizational architectures aect the performance of a complex PD project. According to socio-technical coordination strategy, PD teams should interact only when there are interactions among the subsystems they develop. There is some empirical documentation on that approach being applied to complex products and the observation that misalignments do occur.
Misalignments are expected to have a negative eect on the product development process (Sosa et al. 2004 , Gokpinar et al. 2010 . However, neither the extent of the eect on the performance nor possible strategies to manage it have been examined. We conceptualize misalignments as a cause for PD teams to search on perceived rather than real landscapes. We then theorize the possible consequences in PD systems organized in a centralized or decentralized decision-making structure, and also, in PD systems with varying interaction patterns.
We study misalignments in their eect on time required to develop a product and the design quality. We also conduct our experiments on PD systems with varying interaction patterns and landscape complexity levels (i.e., intensity of interactions among PD subsystems).
Spurious communications are argued to have less disruptive eects than hidden dependencies (Sosa et al. 2015) . However, these arguments consider dyad or triad subsystems which may not be the case for PD projects with many subsystems whose interactions vary in criticality or strength.
Some empirical studies on misalignments (e.g., Gokpinar et al. (2010) ), focus on the occurrence of misalignments rather than their type and examined the PD project's performance over a given time period. Such assumptions arise from the essential challenges in observing PD teams behavior and limit the previous studies in the sense that the eects of dierent misalignment types in PD systems with various interaction patterns and complexity levels are not examined. More importantly, the previous empirical examination of misalignments have used either formal (e.g., Gokpinar et al. (2010)) or informal (e.g., (Sosa et al. 2015) ) communications, and have not considered both communication types whereas, our model by using dynamic interactions among teams, incorporates both communication types.
We nd that misalignments improve the quality of the nal design solution whenever PD projects are structured in a decentralized decision-making organization. This result is specially pronounced in projects with hidden dependencies and with a modular subsystem interaction pattern. Hidden dependencies cause a longer convergence time in modular projects but otherwise misalignments do not seem to aect the time it takes to converge to a nal solution. These observations somewhat echo the long-run benets of coordination neglect in a distributed problem-solving systems (Baumann 2015) , and extend them to dynamically-interacting problem solvers. Our analysis shows that the underlying mechanism for these observations is the type-II error: a search process that commits larger type-II errors tends to explore more over the search landscape and obtain better quality designs and take a longer time to converge.
Our research is exploratory in nature and relies on simulation to develop a theory (Davis et al. 2007 ). We believe our framework and observations provide a rich set of hypotheses for future empirical research. In particular, we suggest the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. PD projects with hidden dependencies obtain higher tness values and need longer time to converge when compared with spurious communications when either of the followings holds (and regardless of the decision-making organization):
• A modular product is being developed, • A product's subsystems interacting according to either of the hierarchical or dependent patterns, and its its design complexity exceeds a threshold level.
An implication of hypothesis 1, when tested and conrmed, is that under the specied conditions, PD managers should utilize PD teams with low cohesion (e.g., teams with low common experience and uid teams (Huckman et al. 2009 ) or isolated work groups (Fang et al. 2010) ). Misalignment types are unlikely to be distributed randomly across PD subsystems (Gokpinar et al. 2010 , Sosa et al. 2015 ) and hence the above implication might be applied for those PD systems for which managers expect the misalignment types (hidden dependencies and spurious communications) to have similar likelihood of occurrence.
Hypothesis 1 also relates to the literature on social networks and creativity (Amabile 1996 , Uzzi 1997 , Uzzi and Spiro 2005 , and in particular the literature on product development (Sosa 2011 ) which argue that network cohesion can decrease PD teams' creativity. Hence, they expect an inverted U-shape relation between social embeddedness and PD teams' performance. However, little attention has been given to compare the performance of PD teams with low (i.e., prone to hidden dependencies) and high (i.e., prone to spurious communications) network cohesion levels.
We also studied whether misalignments always degrade the performance and delay convergence.
In an empirical investigation of software development projects, Kwan et al. (2011) nd that aligned systems do not necessarily achieve higher success rates. Our results show that with a modular product design, spurious communications do not cause any performance loss or convergence delay.
However, with a hierarchical or dependent design, the decision-making organization may matter.
In a centralized organization that employs a capable manager or a decentralized organization, the presence of misalignments (of any type) improves the tness value but lengthens the time to converge to that design. The same observation holds only for hidden dependencies when decisions are made in a centralized organization with an inexperienced manager. Therefore, we oer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. In PD projects with modular interaction patterns, and regardless of the decisionmaking organization, spurious communications do not make any eects on performance (quality and convergence time) in comparison to the aligned PD systems.
Hypothesis 3. In PD projects with either a decentralized organization or a centralized organization that employs a capable manager, when design complexity exceeds a threshold level, misaligned projects tend to: (i) attain higher tness values than the aligned systems, and (ii) need longer time to converge than the aligned projects.
Hypothesis 4. In PD projects a centralized organization that employs an inexperienced manager, when design complexity exceeds a threshold level, hidden dependencies tend to: (i) attain higher tness values than the aligned systems, and (ii) need longer time to converge than the aligned projects.
Our work has some implications for the literature on landscape search and complex organizational design. NK simulation method and mathematical search models have both shown that centralized systems have shorter convergence time whereas decentralized ones increase the solution quality (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003 , Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005 , Mihm et al. 2010 . We nd intermediating factors in PD projects with diverse interaction patterns among their subsystems. Our dynamic team interaction model can be embedded in complex organization and PD models (e.g., Mihm et al. (2003 Mihm et al. ( , 2010 ) to examine how informal interactions along with formal ones can aect the organizational search processes (e.g., solution stability, quality, and search speed).
We conclude by discussing some limitations in our work. First, our modied NK model is computationally intensive which makes it dicult to study products with a larger number of subsystems and teams. This problem is due mainly to each team searching on a landscape that changes shape during each time period in response to other teams changing the design parameters on their own respective landscapes. This phenomenon has been referred to as dancing landscapes (Kauman 1993) . Complex products may have varying interaction patterns in dierent decomposition levels (Suh et al. 2015 , Min et al. 2016 ) and future research may address whether our results are robust to signicant changes in the number of subsystems and teams (e.g., projects with 50 designers/teams).
Second, we dened two particular organizational structures but the organization of PD projects could be more complex. For instance, how managers and departments at various layers of a hierarchy are grouped and coordinated can have signicant eects on the organization's search performance (Mihm et al. 2010) . Moreover, delegations of decisions and incentives (Baumann and Stieglitz 2014) are important aspects of organizations that are not considered in our model. Investigating how organizational arrangement in dierent hierarchy layers and the corresponding incentives and reward systems can mitigate eects of misalignments in PD projects is a promising research opportunity.
Finally, we believe that our results can be tested by adopting other analytical or computational methods. For instance, Sommer and Loch (2004) use the traveling salesman problem (TSP) to investigate selectionism and learning in complex projects. Our research could be extended also by employing a multi-TSP model to investigate the main questions addressed in this paper. Once the subsystem-level search process concludes, the product-level search process commences. In a decentralized decision-making organizational structure, the product-level search follows the following algo- 6: For each path, check its eligibility: a path is eligible if its size is less than or equal Z − 1.
7: For each eligible path, start from the rst node (e.g., node 1 in path 1 − 4 − 3) and put the nodes in odd positions (e.g., node 1 in path 1 − 4 − 3) in set Sa.
8: For each eligible path, start from the rst node (e.g., node 1 in path 1 − 4 − 3) and put the nodes in even positions (e.g., node 4 in path 1 − 4 − 3) in set Sa . Variants of dependent interactions patterns among four PD teams. 
